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of

~enator

Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
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THE DEADLOCK AT GENEVA

After four weeks of negotiating in Geneva we have little to show
for our efforts.

If the usual procedure is followed, we can expect agitation

to the effect that we are wasting our time and that our representatives ought
to come home.
mistake.

For them to do so at this time, in my opinion, would be a

It has taken four weeks to bring to a head the basic business of the

conference.

That basic business is Berlin, even though the question of

Berlin is related to other questions affecting Germany as a whole and Central
Europe.

However, we must not lose sight of the fact that it was the Berlin

Crisis which brought the Geneva Conference into being in the first place and
not the larger questions of German reunification or European security.
In the light of disturbing reports of impending failure at Geneva,
I should like to recall that just four months ago I addressed the Senate on
the German situation.

In subsequent discussions on the floor other Members

analyzed this situation in detail and discussed possibilities for meeting the
problems which it posed.

I recall, particularly, the observations of the

distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Mr, Fulbright),
the remarks of the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd), the bold plan of the
Senator from Indiana (Mr. Capehart) and the critical and constructive comments
of the Senator from New York (Mr. Javits).

- 2 When I spoke on the German situation last February, I was moved
to do so by one principal consideration.

we are now, to stand fast in West Berlin.

We were committed at that time , as

It seemed to me, however, that

we were committed to that position in support of policies which, conceived
more than a decade earlier under another Administration, had become
inadequate, if not obsolete, in the light of current conditions and the current
needs of this nation and other Western states .

It seemed to me that those

policies no longer held realistic hope of leading towards a stable peace and

the greater security of freedom in Germany and Europe.

They promised - ..

these inadequate and obsolete policies - .. at best only a desperate and costly

rearguard action to maintain a surface status quo which was becoming ever
more separated from the underlying realities of the evolving situation in
Germany, Europe and the world. At worst, those policies promised a
disastrous diplomatic retreat or a catastrophic war -- limited or unlimited
-- a war by accident or miscalculation.
These thoughts, Mr. President, were spoken freely in the Senate
last February 12. and in four subsequent speeches.
the intent of being constructive.

They were spoken with

They were spoken out of a desire to cooperate

responsibly with the Administration.

They were spoken in the hope of

encouraging a wide utilization of the most powerful device of freedom - - the
device of full and free discussion -- in order to recast and to strengthen our
policies to meet the impending crisis in Germany.
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In that spirit, Mr. President, I advanced nine essentials for a
positive Western policy on Germany.

These proposals were not, for the

most part, original except in their restatement in the context of my remarks.
Nor were they set forth in a package, on an all-or-nothing basis.

On the

contrary, some of them were already implicit in our policies, and all of
them were obviously subject to modification and elaboration.

Nevertheless ,

they were set forth, as one Senator 1 s viewB, of a possible way around the
dangerous impasse towards which the world appeared to be headed in Germany.
Let me recall in summary form at this point these nine suggested
essentials of policy, as they were stated and developed in subsequent speeches.
(1)

~tand

fast in Berlin, not as a slogan, not as an end in itself

but as the basis for a Western initiative for peace in Europe.
{Z} Call upon the German leaders of the East and West Berlin
communities to be gin serious negotiations for unifying the public services and
municipal government of that city.
(3) Enlist the conciliatory services of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations in the effort to bring about the interim unification and neutralizabut of al1 Berlini
tion. not just of West Berlin/guarantee by U.N. or other international
means the free use of the routes of access to the entire city until such time
as it became once again the capital of a unified Germany.
(4) If this or a similar approach to interim unification and
neutralization of all Berlin is not obtained, then continue the Western
presence in Wes t Berlin, whether or not the Russians chose to leave the
other sector of the city.

- 4 (5) If forced to maintain the Western presence in West Berlin in
such circumstances, however, consider seriously withdrawing the garrisons

of French, British and American forces from the city and replacing them

with West Germans supported by NATO guarantees.
(6) Call upon the Germans in authority in West and East Germany
to talk, to talk a great deal on the whole range of problems involved in
harmonizing the political, economic and military systems of the two zones
as an essential preliminary step to the unification of Germany.
(7) Call upon the East German communists and the Russians to
permit the exercise, without the threat of terror, of basic political freedoms
in the Eastern zone, as a preliminary to reunification.
(8) 8eek agreements between the Foviet Union and the Western
allies to guarantee for a period of years the kind of unified Germany which
might emerge from German discussions and see to it that a reunited Germany
is neither subjected to military pressures by its neighbors or becomes a

source of aggressive military pressure on them.
(9) To that end consider agreements for the control and limitation
of armaments in Germany and Central Europe along the line s of the Eden
Plan, the Rapacki Plan and similar plans, predicating them on satisfactory
agreements being reached at the Geneva Conferences on the Prevention of
Surprise Attacks and the Suspension of Nuclear Testing.
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Mr. President. when these proposals were advanced initially there was

a g reat deal of comment on them both at home and abroad. Some of it Vias
critical and some of the criticism was little short of an expression of

shoc :~ ed

disbelief.

Yet the proposals were not too far removed from the cban e es which
Mr. Dulles was seeking to bring about in Western policy during his last trip
abroad, shorUy before he was stric:.en.

Since that time, Mr. President. we

hz-ve, in fact. witnessed a major evolution of United States and Vlestern policy
......-ith respect to Germany in the direction of these proposals.
This nation went into the present Geneva Conference with a eeneral
approach which re p resented a sharp modification of the policies to which we
had clun e for years.

The new approach haa made it evident that while we would

stand fast in Berlin, we would do 80 not as an end in itself. but as the basia for
movine towards a reasonable settlement of basic Berlin. German and European
problems.

Beyond standing fast, we have suge ested at Geneva a specific plan

for bringin g about

ne ~ otiations

for the reunification of the public services and

municipal government of that city.

We have called for a phased reunification

of c.ll Germany based upon extensive contact and extensive talk on the part of
the German authorities of the East and Vl est prior to free. all-German elections.
VIe have sought the restoration of the right of Open political activity for all
Germans, free of terror and le gal re p risals. in both zones.
our willingness to

aee ~<

vre have

expressed

a e reements between the Soviet Union and the Western

nations to f:, uarantee a unified Germany and ita neichbors lle ainst a a eression.

j

r
_6 -

We have noted our willingness to consider limitin e the level of armaments in
both parts of Germany and a reduction in foreign forces in that country ·-a
position which seems to me to encompass the basic philosopby of the Eden
and

R~pac l~ i

Plans.

There is really only one sharp difference. Mr. President, between
the proposals which I suggested last February and the proposals which are
listed in what has been termed the Western Packa3e at Geneva.

Vie did not

see fit to de al initially with Berlin as the most pressing of the German prob lems and I am sure Mr. Herter and his associates h:lve had f:; oad reasons
for p roceeding as they have until now.

Nor have we--Mr. Hammarskjold

apparently concurring--seen fit to call upon the conciliatory services of the
United Nations Secretary General to bring about an interim neutralization of
all Berlin under internationel auspices.
One other of the nine essentials of policy listed last

~ebruary

is not

emb r aced in pre sent policy; that is, the possible substitution of \"l est Germans
for the British, French and American e arrison in \lc st Berlin.

That pro -

pose.1, however, was obviously not associated with a peace settlement.

On

the contrary, it was intended as an alternative if the efforts to nc z otiate a
settlement in good faith were to fail.
Mr. President, I have taken the time of the Senate to review in
juxtaposition discussions a nd events that occurred in the past, and have
since

ta l~en

place at Geneva .

I have not

undertal~en

this comparison out of

any desire to vindicate a position. I have not had occasion to alter that

- "I -

position significantly in the past and I see no need to justify it now.
presented, in February, as one Senator's views.

It was

It is still one Senator's

views.
No, Mr. President, that has not been my purpose.

My purpose

today as it was last February is to contribute constructively to the policies
which this Administration conducts on behalf of all of us, on behalf of all the
people of this nation--the policies upon which the peace and the well-being of
the United States so greatly depend.
Specifically, Mr. President, 1 wish, today, to call attention to the
fact that when I initially advanced the nine proposals they were not criticized

by a man who by the nature of his position has an enormous influence upon
the prospects for peace in the world.

The Senate may recall that Premier

Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union commented publicly on the remarks
which I made on February 12.

I refer. Mr. President, to a news story which

appeared in the Washington Star. February 19. 1959.
Mr. Khrushchev is reported in this story as hailing as IIworthy of
attention" certain of these proposals.

He went on to say that IIOne could

reach agreement with people who have adopted such sober attitudes." He
went on to say. further. "Supporters of the cold war are attacking Mansfield
and accusing him of making concessione to the U.S.S.R.
any concessions to

UB.

Nobody is making

Mansfield is just thinking soberly and sensibly."

It was the recollection of that comment by Mr. Khrushchev which
led me to make this statement, today. at a moment when the Geneva

-cConference may be in dancer of failure.

'iThat 1 wish to point out is this: If

the Soviet Premier believed a few months a go th2.t the

~ropos~ls

which 1 had

made were "sober and sensible," and, if, as I have just noted, p roposals of
a very similar nature have been introduced at Geneva by the Y!estern delegations, then, perhaps, Mr. Khrushchev should also re zard the latter as "sober
and sensible . "
True, Mr. President. in comparing the statement which I made on
February 12 with the VTestern proposals which were presented in Geneva, one
may find that the ni's" are not always dotted in precisely the same w<:..y and the
"t's" are not always crossed exactly a1i!;e.

But the intent is very similar.

Therefore, if the Soviet Fremier believed that a Qasis for bonafide neeotiations
resided in my staten-.ent, he may' rest assured that it is also
\1 estern proposals.

~ resent

in the

Unless he has changed his mind since that time or unless

he has not been adequately informed, 1 believe Mr. Khrushchev will find that
these V!eatern p roposals at the Conference are equally, if not .:.ore so, "worthy
of attention. ' I I believe he will discover that the Secretary of State, Mr . Herter,
has presented these p roposals not out of any attemp t to secure a hollow propazanda victory. not out of any desire to exacerbate the cold war,

~ ut

in a sincere

effort to express in a practical fashion, the desire of the people of the United
States to find a secure and equitable settlement of the fundamental p roblems of
a divided Berlin. a divided Germany and a divided Zurope.

J.t the least, I

respectfully s u c ;:;est to Mr. Khrushchev that these proposals are worthy of a
more careful treetment at the hc:.nds of the Soviet Premier than they received
at the hands of the Soviet dele!:;ation which tended to dismiss them as completely
unacceptabl e or too involved or too complex.

- c,,Mr. President, I caLL the attention of the roviet Premier to these
matters in the hope that, as he

recogniz~s

that the larger interests of the

Russian people, the people of the United Uates and all peoples require peace,
no less will he recognize that the wish for peace must be translated into the
acts of peace.

Specifically , it must be translated into agreements .

What is

done in this connection at Geneva is essential to what may come later at a
summit.
U the West were to go to the summit, or, indeed, if the foviet Union

were to go to the summit with the two positions as far apart as they now are,
as a realist, ?vIr. Krushchev must know that little if anything wouLd be accomplished.

That is why I hope the Soviet premier himself will consider the

Western proposals.

I hope he will study them.

personal study, he will be specific,

I hope, on the basis of his

he wiLL instruct his aides at Geneva in

terms of "this we can accept and this we must talk about further".

It seems

to me, in the light of President Eisenhower's desire and effort to be reasonable, in the light of the new approach which the Western nations have pursued
at Geneva, Borne such action on Mr . Krushchev's part is essential at this
point to advance the cause of peace.

He can do much to cLarify the areas of

agreement which already exist and to delineate the areas of disagreement
which must be reconciled by direct talks of Heads of States.

Unless this is

done now, what, indeed, can we or the Russians expect to achieve by a meeting of a few days duration at the summit? U there is. in fact, something else
to be achieved then it would be helpful if the Soviet Premier made c lear what
it is.
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I urge this course, in all sincerity, on the Soviet Premier.

1 urge

him to take it before positions solidify into the brittle crusts of propaganda.
before decisions are made that cannot be revoked.
say that it may not be possible to stop the

~oviet

In this connection let me

Union from making a separate

peace treaty with East Germany, if that is its intention.

Nor can that nation

be stopped from withdrawing its forces from BerLin,if it so desires. before a
broad settLement is reached.

U either of these irrevocable steps is taken,

however. the tasks of peace-making will be infinitely compounded.
breach may no Longer b e clos abl e in this generation or the next.

The
The seeds

of inevitable war may we LL be implanted.

The moment calls for patience, not impetuosity.
ance.

It calls for forebear-

This is not the time for the Vlest or for the Soviet Union to entertain

the idea of picking up their respective marbles and going home.
We have stated and we will continue to reiterate, as the President and
Secretary Herte r have on so many occasions, that there wiLL be no summit
meeting unless a degree

a progress

is achieved.

The President noted on

June 3 that he would be prepared to define Liberally what he meant by progress.
I commend him for his wilLingneRs to stay in the game and for his statesmanship in giving every pos sible encouragement to our Secretary of State in the
difficult negotiations now being conducted in Geneva.
If we are firmly convinced that there is no basis for a settlement. then

we should be prepared to break off the conference,

cleanly. honestly. and

without futile recriminations.

how ever. until every

We should not do

80.

-11possibLe facet is explored and every possibl e move i8 made.
that it is be

int~nt

I am certain

of the President and Secretary Herter and his colleagues

to strive to arrive at equitable agreements.

I am likewise certain that if

and when the time arrives whe n the representatives of the Vi est are convinced
that there is no point in continuing the talks at Geneva, that they will make
their decision known and return to their respective countries.
however, that point has not yet been reached.

Certainly.

Let us be in no hurry.

Let

us be patient and Let us explore every reasonable and honorable channel in
the hope that an agreement is atill possible and that the deepest desire of
mankind can, at Least in part. be realized.

No nation at this critical time

has the right to be mor e interested in saving face than in safeguarding
civilization.

